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Abstract: We investigate the impact of Byzantine attacks in distributed detection under binary hypothesis testing. It is assumed that a
fraction of the transmitted sensor measurements are compromised by the injected data from a Byzantine attacker, whose purpose is to
confuse the decision maker at the fusion center. From the perspective of a Byzantine attacker, under the injection energy constraint, an
optimization problem is formulated to maximize the asymptotic missed detection error probability, which is based on the Kullback-
Leibler divergence. The properties of the optimal attack strategy are analyzed by convex optimization and parametric optimization
methods. Based on the derived theoretic results, a coordinate descent algorithm is proposed to search the optimal attack solution.
Simulation examples are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the obtained attack strategy.
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1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) deploy a large number of
sensors to monitor their environment and transmit their mea-
surements to a remote fusion center over wireless communi-
cation links. They have been extensively applied in health
care monitoring, environmental sensing and industrial moni-
toring. Based on these received measurements, the fusion cen-
ter makes a decision about the presence or absence of the phe-
nomenon of interest. Distributed detection at the fusion center
has been well studied in detection theory literature [1, 2].
However, these sensors are vulnerable to malicious attacks
due to their own limited capabilities and the distributed nature
of WSNs. One typical attack type is Byzantine attack. Ac-
cording to [3], Byzantine attack refers to tampering or falsify-
ing the transmitted data by some internal adversary who has
the knowledge about the WSNs. The purpose of the Byzan-
tine attackers is to confuse the fusion center and let the fu-
sion center make an incorrect decision about the state of na-
ture. Distributed detection in the presence of Byzantine attacks
has been widely studied in state-of-the-art works. Marano et
al. [4] considered the distributed detection under the Neyman-
Pearson setup, where a fraction of the sensors were compro-
mised by a Byzantine attacker. An optimal attack strategy to
minimize the detection error exponent, which is based on the
Kullback-Leibler divergence, was obtained by using a “water-
filling” procedure. Rawat et al. [5] analyzed the performance
limits of collaborative spectrum sensing with the presence of
Byzantine attackers, who did not know the true state of na-
ture. Optimal strategies for the Byzantine attackers and the
fusion center were derived under a minimax game framework.
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Kailkhura et al. [6] adopted Chernoff information as the per-
formance metric and obtained closed-form expressions for the
optimal attack strategies which degraded the detection perfor-
mance most in the asymptotic regime.
All the works discussed so far for distributed detection un-
der Byzantine attacks consider scenarios where the values of
transmitted measurements can only be chosen from a discrete
finite alphabet, i.e., {0, 1}. We consider a more general case
where the measurement can be any real number. Furthermore,
a constraint for the attack power is taken into consideration
in our work. We are interested in analytically characterizing
the impact of the malicious data injected by a Byzantine at-
tacker. Specifically, from the Byzantine attacker’s perspective,
what is the most effective attack strategy under limited injec-
tion power?
In this work, we adopt a standard model in distributed de-
tection under binary hypotheses H0 versus H1 with known
Gaussian distributions. Measurements are independently and
identically distributed conditioned on the unknown hypothesis.
We assume that the Byzantine attacker knows the true state of
nature and they inject independent Gaussian noises to a frac-
tion of the measurements based on this knowledge. The fusion
center makes the detection under the Neyman-Pearson setup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces the Byzantine attack model and the problem
of interest. Section 3 provides some preliminaries about the
approximation methods of the KL divergence between Gaus-
sian mixture models. Section 4 presents the main theoretic
results regarding the optimal attack strategy and proposes an
algorithm to search the optimal solution. Section 5 shows sim-
ulation examples and gives interpretations. Section 6 draws
conclusions.
Notations: R denotes the set of real numbers. Rn is the n-
dimensional Euclidean space. Sn+ (S
n
++) is the set of n×n pos-
itive semi-definite (definite) matrices. When X ∈ Sn+ (S
n
++)
, we simply write X  0 (X ≻ 0). N (µ, Σ) denotes a
Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance Σ. The nota-
tion ∼ is read as “is distributed according to”. Tr(·) stands for
the trace of a matrix. ‖ · ‖ and the superscript (·)⊤ denote the
Euclidean norm and the transpose of a vector, respectively.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a binary state detection problem, where θ ∈
{0, 1}, using m sensors’ measurements. Define the measure-
ment from sensor j as xj ∈ R
n. Given the state θ, we as-
sume that all measurements {xj}j=1,2,...,m are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). When the state θ = 0, the
probability measure generated by xj is f0 and when θ = 1,
it is denoted as f1. We assume that the probability measures
f0 and f1 are Gaussian distributions under two hypothesesH0
andH1:
H0 : f0 ∼ N (µ0, Σ0) ,
H1 : f1 ∼ N (µ1, Σ1) ,
where Σ0,Σ1 ≻ 0.
2.1 Byzantine attack model
Denote the manipulated measurements at sensor j as
x⋆j = xj + x
a
j ,
where xaj ∈ R
n is the bias vector injected by the attacker obey-
ing Gaussian distributions under two hypotheses:
H0 : f
a
0 ∼ N (ν0 − µ0, Γ0 − Σ0) ,
H1 : f
a
1 ∼ N (ν1 − µ1, Γ1 − Σ1) .
Assume that the injected bias xaj is independent of the original
measurement xj . Furthermore, Γ0  Σ0 and Γ1  Σ1. Corre-
spondingly, the manipulated measurement x⋆j is also Gaussian
distributed. Its probability measures under two hypothesesH0
andH1 are given by
H0 : g0 ∼ N (ν0, Γ0) ,
H1 : g1 ∼ N (ν1, Γ1) .
The following assumption is made on the attacker.
Assumption 1 (Model Knowledge): The attacker knows the
probability measures f0 and f1 and the true state θ.
Generally, this is a common assumption regarding the worst-
case attacks, which is also included in [4, 7–9]. Moreover, this
assumption is in accordance with the Shannon’s maxim, that
is the defensive systems should be designed under the assump-
tion that the enemy will immediately gain full knowledge of
the systems. Therefore, the probability measures f0 and f1
can be developed by the attacker. The true state can be ob-
tained by deploying attacker’s own sensor network. Based on
the model knowledge, the attacker is capable of well design-
ing the injected vectors to confuse the fusion center. Let the
parameter α ∈ (0, 1) represent the attacking power of the ad-
versary. We assume that the m measurements received at the
fusion center are manipulated by the attacker with probability
α. Therefore, the j-th sample at the fusion center is distributed
as follows:
H0 : (1− α) f0 + αg0,
H1 : (1− α) f1 + αg1.
Note that all of thesem measurements are conditional i.i.d..
2.2 Problem of interest
The attacker aims at devastating the detection perfor-
mance at the fusion center. Similar to [4] and [10],
we quantify the impact of Byzantine attacks by Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence, which measures the “distance”
between the hypotheses under test. The KL diver-
gence D ((1− α) f0 + αg0 ‖ (1− α) f1 + αg1) determines
the missed detection error probability under the Neyman-
Pearson setup by Stein’s lemma [11]. A smaller KL divergence
implies a larger missed detection error probability at the fusion
center. The attacker should choose fa0 and f
a
1 wisely to min-
imize the KL divergence under an injection energy constraint.
We consider the following optimization problem from the per-
spective of the Byzantine attacker:
Problem 1
min
fa
0
,fa
1
,α
D ((1− α) f0 + αg0 ‖ (1− α) f1 + αg1) ,
s.t. 0 < α < 1, Γ0  Σ0, Γ1  Σ1,
α [ Tr (Γ0 + Γ1 − Σ0 − Σ1)
+ ‖ν0 − µ0‖
2 + ‖ν1 − µ1‖
2 ] ≤ δ,
where δ is a given positive constant, denoting the degree of
difficulty for the Byzantine attack. A larger δ allows more en-
ergy to inject, which avails the attacker of more opportunities
to launch the Byzantine attack.
3 Preliminary: KL Divergence Approximation be-
tween Gaussian Mixture Models
In this section, we introduce several methods to approximate
the KL divergence between two Gaussian mixtures, which is a
key supporting technique to deal with the objective in Prob-
lem 1, since there is no accurate closed-form expression.
3.1 Monte Carlo sampling
For large dimension n, Monte Carlo sim-
ulation is the only method that can estimate
D ((1− α) f0 + αg0 ‖ (1− α) f1 + αg1) with arbitrary
accuracy. We can draw i.i.d. samples {zi} from the probabil-
ity density function (1− α) f0 + αg0, and we have [12]:
lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
i=1
log
[(1− α) f0 + αg0] (zi)
[(1− α) f1 + αg1] (zi)
→ D ((1− α) f0 + αg0 ‖ (1− α) f1 + αg1) .
3.2 Upper bound approximation
By the chain rule for relative entropy [11], the upper bound
of the KL divergence can be given by:
D ((1− α) f0 + αg0 ‖ (1− α) f1 + αg1)
≤ (1− α)D (f0 ‖ f1) + αD (g0 ‖ g1) .
3.3 Gaussian approximation
A common method is to replace the Gaussian mixtures with
modified Gaussian distributions [12]. Denote the Gaussian ap-
proximations as ya0 and ya1 :
H0 : ya0 ∼N ( (1− α)µ0 + αν0, (1− α) Σ0 + αΓ0
+ α (1− α) (µ0 − ν0) (µ0 − ν0)
⊤ ) ,
H1 : ya1 ∼N ( (1− α)µ1 + αν1, (1− α) Σ1 + αΓ1
+ α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1) (µ1 − ν1)
⊤ ) .
Based on this Gaussian approximation method, the KL di-
vergence between two Gaussian mixture models then can be
expressed in a closed form [13].
The above three approximations have their own features.
The Monte Carlo sampling performs much better in accuracy,
especially for high-dimension cases. The upper bound approx-
imation is more concise, but somewhat loose. The Gaussian
approximation is a closed-form expression and probably, it
tends to be followed by more theoretic analysis. In the follow-
ing sections, we mainly focus on the Gaussian approximation
and derive some theoretic results.
4 Main Results
Due to the complexity of Problem 1, in this paper, we only
consider the scalar case n = 1, aiming to get some inspiring
insights. By the Gaussian approximation, the KL divergence
objective is then transformed into:
D (ya0‖ya1) =
1
2
[
(1− α) Σ0 + αΓ0 + α (1− α) (µ0 − ν0)
2
(1− α) Σ1 + αΓ1 + α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1)
2
+
[(1− α)µ1 + αν1 − (1− α)µ0 − αν0]
2
(1− α) Σ1 + αΓ1 + α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1)
2 − 1
− ln
(1− α) Σ0 + αΓ0 + α (1− α) (µ0 − ν0)
2
(1− α) Σ1 + αΓ1 + α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1)
2
]
.
The problem is complex with all the decision variables ν0,
ν1, Γ0, Γ1, and α. To deal with this challenging situation, we
mildly simplify it by fixing variables ν0, ν1, and α first, and
we show that it can be transformed into a convex optimization
by change of variables with respect to Gaussian variances Γ0
and Γ1. Second, we reduce the solution space to a search space
only depending upon the Gaussian means ν0 and ν1, and the
attacking power α. By proving that the new objective is con-
tinuous at the above three variables, we reveal the special char-
acteristics of the optimal attack solution. Finally, a coordinate
descent algorithm is proposed to search the optimal Byzantine
attack policy.
4.1 Results regarding Γ0 and Γ1
In this subsection, we fix the Gaussian means ν0 and ν1, and
the attacking power α. For notational convenience, we define
the following constants:
c0 ,
(1− α) Σ0 + α (1− α) (µ0 − ν0)
2
α
> 0,
c1 ,
(1− α) Σ1 + α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1)
2
α
> 0,
c2 ,
[(1− α)µ1 + αν1 − (1− α)µ0 − αν0]
2
α
≥ 0.
The Byzantine attack optimization problem is then trans-
formed into
Problem 2
min
Γ0,Γ1
1
2
(
Γ0 + c0
Γ1 + c1
+
c2
Γ1 + c1
− 1− ln
Γ0 + c0
Γ1 + c1
)
,
s.t. α [ Γ0 + Γ1 − Σ0 − Σ1
+ (ν0 − µ0)
2
+ (ν1 − µ1)
2
] ≤ δ,
Γ0 ≥ Σ0, Γ1 ≥ Σ1.
Tomake the problem feasible, we further assume that the given
variables satisfy
δ ≥ α
[
(ν0 − µ0)
2
+ (ν1 − µ1)
2
]
, 0 < α < 1.
We propose another attack optimization Problem 3 and give
the following Theorem 1.
Problem 3
min
Γ˜0,Γ˜1
1
2
(
Γ˜0 − ln Γ˜0 + c2Γ˜1 − 1
)
,
s.t. Γ˜0 ≥ (Σ0 + c0) Γ˜1,
Γ˜0 ≤
[
δ
α
− (ν0 − µ0)
2 − (ν1 − µ1)
2 +Σ0 +Σ1
+ c0 + c1
]
Γ˜1 − 1,
Γ˜1 ≤
1
Σ1 + c1
.
Theorem 1 Problem 2 is equivalent to Problem 3, which is a
convex optimization problem.
Proof By the change of variables, i.e., Γ˜0 ,
Γ0 + c0
Γ1 + c1
and
Γ˜1 ,
1
Γ1 + c1
, it is trivial to verify that Problem 2 is equiv-
alent to Problem 3. Moreover, the objective of Problem 3 is
convex and constraints are also convex, which shows that it is
a convex optimization. 
As a result, we can use the existing algorithms, i.e., gradient
descent, to obtain the optimal solutions to Problem 3, instead
of endeavoring to solve the general Problem 2.
4.2 Results regarding ν0, ν1, and α
For the remaining three variables ν0, ν1 and α, we will show
that there exist some good properties for the optimal solutions.
It is treated as a parametric optimization problem. Before that,
some preliminaries are presented first. We give the follow-
ing terms, definitions and Lemma 1, mainly based on [14] and
[15].
Definition 1 Let S and Ψ be subsets of Rℓ and Rm, respec-
tively. A correspondence C from Ψ to S is a map that asso-
ciates each element ψ ∈ Ψ with a nonempty subset C (ψ) ⊂ S.
We denote such a correspondence as C : Ψ⇒ S.
Definition 2 A correspondence C : Ψ ⇒ S is upper-
semicontinuous at ψ ∈ Ψ if and only if for any open set V
such that C(ψ) ⊂ V , there exists an open set U containing
ψ, such that for any ψ′ ∈ U ∩ Ψ, C(ψ′) ⊂ V holds. It is
said to be upper-semicontinuous onΨ if and only if it is upper-
semicontinuous at each ψ ∈ Ψ.
Definition 3 A correspondence C : Ψ ⇒ S is lower-
semicontinuous at ψ ∈ Ψ if and only if for any open set V
such that V ∩ C(ψ) 6= ∅, there exists an open set U contain-
ing ψ such that for any ψ′ ∈ U ∩ Ψ, V ∩ C(ψ′) 6= ∅ holds.
It is said to be lower-semicontinuous on Ψ if and only if it is
lower-semicontinuous at each ψ ∈ Ψ.
Definition 4 A correspondence C : Ψ ⇒ S is continuous on
Ψ if and only if C is both upper-semicontinuous and lower-
semicontinuous on Ψ.
Definition 5 A correspondence C : Ψ⇒ S is said to be
1) compact-valued at ψ ∈ Ψ if C(ψ) is a compact set;
2) convex-valued at ψ ∈ Ψ if C(ψ) is a convex set.
A correspondence C is said to be compact-valued (convex-
valued) if it is compact-valued (convex-valued) at each ψ ∈ Ψ.
Lemma 1 (Berge’s Maximum Theorem under Convexity) Let
f : S×Ψ→ R be a continuous function, and f(·, ψ) is convex
in s ∈ S for each given ψ ∈ Ψ. Let C : Ψ ⇒ S be a continu-
ous, compact-valued, and convex-valued correspondence. Let
f⋆ : Ψ→ R and C⋆ : Ψ⇒ S be defined as:
f⋆(ψ) , min
s∈S
{f(s, ψ) | s ∈ C(ψ)} , (1)
C⋆(ψ) , {s ∈ C(ψ) | f(s, ψ) = f⋆(ψ)} . (2)
Then f⋆ is a continuous function on Ψ, and C⋆ is an upper-
semicontinuous, compacted-valued, and convex-valued corre-
spondence on Ψ.
Lemma 1 is a variant of the Berge’s maximum theorem. One
can find the proof from Theorem 9.17 in [14].
Based on the above preliminaries, we denote two
variables as s ,
[
Γ˜0 Γ˜1
]⊤
and ψ , [ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
.
A subset S of R2 is described as S = {s | s > 0},
and a subset Ψ of R3 is described as Ψ ={
ψ
∣∣∣ α [(ν0 − µ0)2 + (ν1 − µ1)2] ≤ δ, 0 < α < 1}. A
continuous function f : S ×Ψ→ R is defined as:
f(s, ψ) ,
1
2
[
Γ˜0 − ln Γ˜0 − 1
+
[(1− α)µ1 + αν1 − (1− α)µ0 − αν0]
2
α
Γ˜1
]
.
For notational convenience, we define the following two func-
tions d0, d1 : Ψ→ R as:
d0 (ψ) ,
(1− α)Σ0 + α (1− α) (µ0 − ν0)
2
α
,
d1 (ψ) ,
(1− α)Σ1 + α (1− α) (µ1 − ν1)
2
α
.
A correspondence C : Ψ⇒ S is defined as:
C(ψ) ,
{
s | Γ˜0 ≥ (Σ0 + d0 (ψ)) Γ˜1,
Γ˜0 ≤
[
δ
α
− (ν0 − µ0)
2 − (ν1 − µ1)
2
+Σ0 +Σ1 + d0(ψ) + d1(ψ)
]
Γ˜1 − 1,
Γ˜1 ≤
1
Σ1 + d1(ψ)
}
.
Consider the optimization problem:
Problem 4
min
s, ψ
f (s, ψ) ,
s.t. s ∈ C(ψ),
where s ∈ S and ψ ∈ Ψ. The definitions of f⋆ and C⋆ are
consistent with those in (1) and (2). Obviously, Problem 4 is
derived from the original Problem 1 via Gaussian approxima-
tion.
Theorem 2 In Problem 4, f⋆ is a continuous function on Ψ,
and C⋆ is an upper-semicontinuous, compacted-valued, and
convex-valued correspondence on Ψ.
Proof The proof is mainly based on Lemma 1. It is obvious
that f(·, ψ), which is the objective in Problem 3, is convex in
s for each given ψ. For the rest part, we need to check the
properties of the correspondence C.
Compact-valuedness of C is obvious, since for each ψ ∈ Ψ,
C(ψ) is closed and bounded. Convex-valuedness is also obvi-
ous. In the following, we will show that the correspondence C
is both upper-semicontinuous and lower-semicontinuous.
(Upper-semicontinuous) Let V be an open set such that
C(ψ) ⊂ V . Define an ǫ-neighborhoodBǫ(ψ) of ψ in Ψ by
Bǫ(ψ) , {ψ
′ ∈ Ψ | ‖ψ′ − ψ‖ < ǫ} .
We will prove the upper-semicontinuity by contradiction. Sup-
pose that C is not upper-semicontinuous at ψ. Then ∀ǫ > 0,
∃ s′ such that s′ ∈ C(ψ′) and s′ /∈ V . Choose a sequence
ǫ(k) → 0, and let ψ(k) ∈ Bǫ(k)(ψ), with s(k) ∈ C(ψ(k)) but
s(k) /∈ V . We will first show that the {s(k)} sequence has a
convergent subsequence since the sequence lies in a compact
set, which is stated by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [16].
Since ψ(k) → ψ, we have ν0(k) → ν0, ν1(k) → ν1 and
α(k) → α. Therefore, there is k⋆ such that for all k ≥ k⋆, we
have
|ν0(k)− ν0| ≤ η, |ν1(k)− ν1| ≤ η, |α(k)− α| ≤ η,
for some small enough positive η. By some tedious but basic
calculations, it follows that for k ≥ k⋆, we have s(k) ∈ M ,
whereM is the compact set defined by:
M ,
{
s ∈ S | Γ˜0 ≥ Σ0Γ˜1, Γ˜1 ≤
1
Σ1
,
Γ˜0 ≤
(
δ
α− η
+ Σ0 +Σ1 + d
max
0 (ψ) + d
max
1 (ψ)
)
Γ˜1 − 1
}
.
For brevity, dmax0 (ψ) and d
max
1 (ψ) are denoted as:
d
max
0 (ψ) ,
(
1
α− η
− 1
)
Σ0 + [1− (α− η)]
×
[
(µ0 − ν0)
2 + η2 + 2η|µ0 − ν0|
]
,
d
max
1 (ψ) ,
(
1
α− η
− 1
)
Σ1 + [1− (α− η)]
×
[
(µ1 − ν1)
2 + η2 + 2η|µ1 − ν1|
]
.
Therefore, there is a subsequence of {s(k)}, which we will
continue to denote by {s(k)} for notation convenience, con-
verging to a limit s¯. Moreover, since s(k) ∈ C(ψ(k)) and
ψ(k) → ψ, s(k) → s¯, we also have s¯ ∈ C(ψ). Because
C(ψ) ⊂ V , s¯ ∈ V is directly obtained. However, s(k) /∈ V
for any k, and V is an open set. Therefore, we also have
s¯ /∈ V , which is a contradiction. This validates the upper-
semicontinuity of the correspondence C.
(Lower-semicontinuous) Let V be an open set such that V ∩
C(ψ) 6= ∅. Let s be a point in this intersection, and therefore
s ∈ C(ψ). We denote an internal point of the triangle area
characterized by C(ψ) as sˆ, i.e.,
sˆ ,

 Σ0+d0(ψ)Σ1+d1(ψ)δ
α
−(ν0−µ0)
2
−(ν1−µ1)
2+2(Σ0+Σ1+d0(ψ)+d1(ψ))
2(Σ1+d1(ψ))[ δα−(ν0−µ0)
2−(ν1−µ1)
2+Σ0+Σ1+d0(ψ)+d1(ψ)]

 .
Since V is open, κs + (1 − κ)sˆ ∈ V for κ < 1, κ close
to 1. Let s˜ , κs + (1 − κ)sˆ, and then s˜ ∈ C(ψ). We will
show the lower-semicontinuity by contradiction. Suppose that
C(ψ′)∩V = ∅ holds for all ψ′ in any neighborhood of ψ. Take
a sequence ǫ(k) → 0, and pick ψ(k) ∈ Bǫ(k)(ψ) such that
C(ψ(k)) ∩ V = ∅. Since C(ψ(k)) → C(ψ), for k sufficient
large, s˜ ∈ C(ψ(k)). It implies s˜ /∈ V , which is a contradiction.
After proving that the correspondence C is continuous,
compact-valued and convex-valued, we conclude that f⋆
is continuous and C⋆ is upper-semicontinuous, compacted-
valued and convex-valued according to Lemma 1. 
Remark 1 Theorem 2 states that f⋆ is continuous at each ψ ∈
Ψ. Fig. 1 illustrates the case when s and ψ are scalars. f⋆ is
represented by the pink curve, which is like “a winding stream
running through high mountains”. It means that for each fixed
Fig. 1: f⋆(ψ) continuous at ψ
ψ, f⋆(ψ) is the minimum which can be found with respect to s.
Moreover, the global minimum of f(s, ψ) is on this pink curve.
We only need to search along this continuous curve, and we
will find the optimal attack strategy for this Byzantine attack
optimization problem.
4.3 Coordinate descent algorithm
In the last subsection, we have proved that f⋆ is continu-
ous at ψ, where ψ = [ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
. With the Gaussian ap-
proximation method, the minimum of Problem 1 then can be
searched along f⋆ by numerical algorithms. Since we have
only proved the existence of continuity for f⋆, other properties,
i.e., differentiability and twice differentiability, are not guaran-
teed. Based only on the continuity, we propose Algorithm 1
to search the optimal Byzantine attack strategy for Problem 4.
The cvx toolbox mentioned is a MATLAB-based modeling
system for convex optimization.
5 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to il-
lustrate the main results. We consider a scenario where the
original probability measures f0 and f1 are distributed as:
H0 : f0 ∼ N (µ0 = 2, Σ0 = 2.8) ,
H1 : f1 ∼ N (µ1 = 10, Σ1 = 3.1) .
As shown in the first sub-figure in Fig. 2, with the Gaussian ap-
proximation method, the KL divergence can be minimized by
using the proposed coordinate descent algorithm when power
constraint δ = 80. After T = 200 iterations, a feasible at-
tack solution is obtained as ν0 = 11.9985, ν1 = 0.3385,
α = 0.4069, Γ0 = 2.8218, Γ1 = 6.3137, and a resulting KL
divergence very close to 0. This attack strategy is derived with
the Gaussian approximation of the KL divergence objective.
The real probability measures and the KL divergence between
two Gaussian mixture models are portrayed in Fig. 3. It can be
seen that the original KL divergence is 10.3251without Byzan-
tine attack. By Monte Carlo sampling, which is introduced in
Section 3.1 with the sample size K = 100000, the KL diver-
gence under Byzantine attack is computed to be 0.8792. The
Algorithm 1 Coordinate Descent Algorithm for Optimal
Byzantine Attack Strategy
1: Input: T, {ak}, {bk}, {ck}
2: Initialization: ν0, ν1, α ∈ (0, 1);
3: cvx Toolbox: compute f⋆
(
[ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
)
;
4: for k = 1 : 1 : T do
5: ν−0 = ν0 − ak;
6: ν+0 = ν0 + ak;
7: cvx Toolbox: compute f⋆
([
ν−0 ν1 α
]⊤)
;
8: cvx Toolbox: compute f⋆
([
ν+0 ν1 α
]⊤)
;
9: if f⋆
([
ν−0 ν1 α
]⊤)
≤ f⋆
([
ν+0 ν1 α
]⊤)
then
10: ν0 ← ν
−
0 ; flag = −1;
11: else
12: ν0 ← ν
+
0 ; flag = 1;
13: end if
14: repeat
15: ν0 ← ν0 + flag× ak;
16: cvx Toolbox: compute f⋆
(
[ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
)
;
17: until f⋆
(
[ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
)
does not descend;
18: do Step 5—- Step 17 for ν1 and αwith searching step lengths
bk and ck, respectively;
19: if f⋆
(
[ν0 ν1 α]
⊤
)
converges w.r.t. iteration k then
20: break;
21: end if
22: end for
decrease of the KL divergence implies a tremendous increase
of the missed detection error probability in the hypothesis test-
ing as follows. Without the Byzantine attack, the false alarm
probability PFA and the missed detection error probability PM
under the Neyman-Pearson setup almost can be zero based on
i.i.d. measurements from 10 sensors. On the other hand, the
designed Byzantine attack increases the missed detection er-
ror probability to P aM = 10.33% while keeping the false alarm
probability under P aFA = 0.04%.
The second sub-figure in Fig. 2 shows the approximated KL
divergence curve with respect to the attacking power α when
constraint level δ = 20. For each fixed α, we compute the
KL divergence by using coordinate descent algorithm. We find
that a larger attacking power leads to a smaller KL divergence,
which means a larger missed detection error probability. No-
tice that the KL divergence is still greater than 0 even when
α ≥ 0.5. This is because the Byzantine attack is launched by
injecting noises instead of directly tampering measurements
and it is conducted under an energy constraint.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a binary hypothesis testing is conducted based
on measurements from a number of identical sensors, some
of which may be compromised by a Byzantine attacker with
probability α. The attacker manipulates the measurements by
injecting independent noises under the power constraint. We
first formulated this attack optimization problem by using KL
divergence to evaluate the attack impact. We then investi-
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Fig. 3: Probability measures without and with attack
gated the optimization problem with Gaussian approximation
method and derived some theoretic results regarding the opti-
mal attack strategy. In addition, a coordinate descent algorithm
based on the theoretic results was proposed to search the op-
timal solution. Numerical examples verified the main results
and showed the attack impact for the original problem, which
is difficult to solve directly. Investigating this problem in vec-
tor case and with other approximation methods is a future di-
rection.
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